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ABSTRACT 
  
The aims of this research is to do relevance on taxpayer compliance attitude based on 
slippery slope theory. The method used in this research is an experimental method with 63 
taxpayers as the samples. The result of this research found that taxpayer trust level on tax 
authority has a positive and significant influence on taxpayer willingness to pay their tax, 
while tax authority‟s power in watching over taxation process does not affect voluntary 
taxpayer compliance in paying tax. The highest voluntary taxpayer compliance rate is shown 
by the taxpayer with high trust in tax authority and has strong tax authority. On the other 
hand, the lowest voluntary taxpayer compliance rate is shown by the taxpayer with low trust 
on tax authority and have weak tax authority. In summary, this research supported the 
slippery slope theory and is hoped to be able to strengthen the relevance of slippery slope 
theory in explaining taxpayer compliance attitude. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It is a fact that every country in this world 
needs to have a huge amount of fund in order to do 
their activities, including Indonesia. Indonesia 
needs an overwhelming amount of fund in order to 
have a good governance, whether for funding or 
debt payments. As quoted from [6], the total 
government revenue that was arranged in State 
Budget (Anggaran Penerimaan dan Belanja 
Negara) 2018 is Rp 1.894,7 trillion. From that 
number, the expected source of government 
revenue is from Tax with Rp 1.618,1 trillion 
(85,40%), Non-Tax Revenue Rp 275,4 trillion 
(14,5%) and Grant Rp 1,2 trillion (0,1%). 
Seeing the amount of government revenue 
that came from the tax sector, the government did 
everything they could to secure it, two of which are 
the Sunset Policy in 2015 and Tax Amnesty in 
2016, as well as making taxation laws to increase 
taxpayer‟s compliance. This program resulted in a 
positive impact on the income from taxpayer 
compliance. As written in [2], government revenue 
from the tax sector in 2017 was Rp 1.151 trillion or 
89,9% from the revenue target in State Budget 
2017. Looking at taxpayer compliance, from 16,6 
million taxpayer, 12,05 million taxpayer gives Tax 
Return, the highest compliance ration ever 
recorded by DGT. 
In correlation with the compliance ratio, 
Small Tax Office (STO) Singaraja experienced the 
same increase of taxpayer compliance. According to 
[1], taxpayer compliance ration in STO Singaraja 
in 2016 is 70%, increased from 68% in 2015 and 
2014.  
This research focused on the phenomenon of 
taxpayer compliance increase in Buleleng Regency 
that was tested with an experimental technique 
that was based on the slippery slope theory. The 
slippery slope theory is a theory that uses an 
approach based on the behavioral paradigm of the 
taxpayer. [5] stated that results of research that 
talked about a slippery slope are still inconsistent, 
especially for tax authority power variable. Aside 
from that, [10] suggested further research, one of 
them is experimental study to further examine the 
slippery slope model empirically. Because of that, 
this research is done to add an empirical study on 
the slippery slope theory so that it could strengthen 
the relevance of that theory to describe taxpayer 
compliance behavior. 
 
Taxpayer Compliance 
Compliance is a condition where taxpayer 
compelled and aware of their tax responsibility 
[13]. Generally, theories on compliance can be 
grouped into Force Theory and Consensus Theory. 
According to Force Theory, people who abide the 
law because of the element of coercion from 
government‟s legal authorities. This is in line with 
the effort to realize voluntary taxpayer compliance.  
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There are two types of compliance, formal 
compliance and material compliance. Formal com-
pliance is a condition where taxpayer fulfilling 
their responsibility formally as stated in Indo-
nesian Taxation Law. Material compliance is a con-
dition where taxpayer fulfills all tax material 
regulations. 
 
Slippery Slope Theory 
Slippery slope theory is one of the theories 
that is used by some researchers to study taxpayer 
compliance in recent years. This theory sees the 
social-psychological variable to be as important as 
deterrence variables such as tax inspection tariffs, 
and tax fine [7] [12]. This theory stated that social-
psychology and deterrence variables have a positive 
influence on tax compliance. Social-psychological 
variables tend to affect voluntary tax compliance, 
while deterrence variables tend to affect tax compliance 
caused by the fear of negative consequences 
(enforced tax compliance) [8]. 
Aside from that, slippery slope theory also 
stated that policies that aim to increase voluntary 
tax compliance depend on the people‟s trust in 
authorities. Policies such as inspection and tax fine 
tend to increase the perception of the power of 
authorities that will affect enforce tax compliance. 
Based on this slippery slope, people trust gain 
policies on tax authority should be prioritized in 
order to increase voluntary tax compliance [8] [11].  
 
 
Figure 1. Slippery Slope Theory Model [7] 
 
Hypothesis Development 
 Based on the slippery slope theory, two main 
factors that affect taxpayer compliance is the trust 
that taxpayer has to tax authority in watching over 
the tax process [7]. The taxpayer will voluntary pay 
their task if they really trust the tax process held 
by the taxpayer without being affected by tax 
authority‟s power of influence [7]. There will be a 
high voluntary taxpayer compliance rate if tax-
payer trust is supported by a strict tax inspection. 
However, it would be a still high even if the tax 
inspection is lenient. This is going in accordance to 
the research done by [3], who found that taxpayer 
trust to tax authority could push them to voluntary 
pay their tax without even considering tax 
authority‟s power of influence.  
 Different compliance is shown if the taxpayer 
has low trust in tax authority. In a condition where 
the taxpayer has low trust and tax authority is 
weak, the taxpayer would be compelled to evade 
their tax because they feel that it is safe to do that 
violation, as a result of tax authority weakness in 
overviewing tax process. Based on research by [14], 
that condition caused a low rate of voluntary tax-
payer compliance. However, even when taxpayer 
trust level is low, if the tax authority has high 
power in overviewing tax process, taxpayer would 
be afraid to evade paying tax so that they would be 
forced to pay their tax, even if that compliance is 
forced (voluntary taxpayer compliance is low) [3] 
[5] [7]. Based on that framework, the proposed 
hypotheses are:  
H1:  There is no significant difference in com-
pliance rate between taxpayer high trust on 
tax authority and having strong tax autho-
rity with taxpayer low trust on tax authority 
and having weak tax authority. 
H2:  Taxpayer with high trust on tax authority 
and have a strong tax authority show a 
higher voluntary compliance than the tax-
payer with low trust and strong tax autho-
rity. 
H3:  Taxpayer with high trust on tax authority 
and have a strong tax authority show a 
higher voluntary compliance than the 
taxpayer with low trust and weak tax 
authority. 
H4:  Taxpayer with high trust on tax authority 
and have a weak tax authority show higher 
voluntary compliance than the taxpayer 
with low trust on tax authority and have 
strong tax authority.  
H5:  Taxpayer with high trust on tax authority 
and have weak tax authority show higher 
voluntary compliance than the taxpayer 
with low trust on tax authority and have 
weak tax authority 
H6:  There is no significant difference between 
taxpayer with low trust on tax authority and 
have a strong tax authority with taxpayer 
with low trust on tax authority and have a 
weak tax authority. 
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RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Experimental design 
  
Hypothesis test on this research used the 
experimental method with 2x2 between-subject 
design. “Trust” and “power” variables are used as a 
treatment in this experiment. The participants 
consist of the randomly chosen taxpayer. There are 
four experimental groups that are grouped by the 
variables used in this research. Below are brief 
descriptions of the four groups used in this experi-
ment: 
1. Group A: this group is given “high trust” and 
“high power” treatment scenario. 
2. Group B: this group is given “high trust” and 
“low power” treatment scenario. 
3. Group C: this group is given “low trust” and 
“high power” treatment scenario. 
4. Group D: this group is given “low trust” and 
“low power” treatment scenario. 
 
This research‟s experimental design can be 
seen in the table 1. 
 
Table 1. Experimental Design 
TRUST 
POWER 
High Low 
High A B 
Low C D 
 
Method of Collecting Data 
 
The data collection is done by spreading rese-
arch instruments to each participant. Here are the 
steps of collecting data for this research: 
1. Research instruments are given to the parti-
cipants. 
2. Participants are directed to read case material 
and are asked to give responses to the given 
case. 
3. Participants are asked to answer manipulation 
check answer and fill in their biodata.  
 
Operational Definition and Variable 
Measurement 
 Independent variables in this research are 
trusted (on tax authority) and power (of the tax 
authority), while the dependent variable is volun-
tary taxpayer compliance. The „trust‟ in this rese-
arch means the view from individuals or social 
groups that tax authority works well for common 
interest [14]. Power is the perception of the tax-
payer on the ability of tax authority to overview the 
tax process in their region or nation [14], while 
voluntary taxpayer compliance is their awareness 
to voluntary fulfill their responsibility as a tax-
payer [13]. 
 Trust and Power are used as experimental 
treatment. To measure voluntary taxpayer com-
pliance rate, this research used a Likert 5 points 
scale. This research used a case study that was 
adapted from the experiments done by [14]. In that 
instrument, there is a description of a fictional 
country on which the trust level and tax authority 
power are fixed for each group's experimental 
treatment. Participants were asked to imagine 
themselves as citizens on that case and were asked 
to show voluntary taxpayer rate in that country. 
 
Data Analysis Technique 
This hypothesis test is done by using two-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) method to test the 
interaction between research variables (power and 
trust) with signification standard (α) = 0,05. 
ANOVA assumption and hypothesis test are done 
with the help of the Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences (SPSS) version 19. 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
 
Data Description 
This experiment is done to 63 Singaraja 
taxpayers. The taxpayers were randomly chosen and 
were invited to become participants. The parti-
cipants consist of 24 men (38,10%) and 39 women 
(61,90%). The average age of the participants is 32. 
Participants are grouped into four treatment 
groups: (1) High Trust-High Power; (2) High Trust-
Low Power; (3) Low Trust-High Power; (4) Low 
Trust-Low Power. The grouping was done ran-
domly. After the participant's data was being 
gathered, the data show that there are reasons 
differences regarding participants‟ voluntary in 
paying taxes on each treatment groups. Below is 
the data description table gathered from this 
research. 
 
Table 2. Demographic Data 
 
Information Amount Percentage (%) 
Gender Men 24 38,10 
Women 39 61,90 
Total 63 100,00 
Age ≤ 30 28 44,44 
31-40 31 49,21 
> 40 4 6,35 
Total 63 100,00 
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Table 3. Participants‟ Responses Based on Trust and 
Power 
Status 
Number of 
Participants 
Voluntary Score 
Average 
Treatment 
Groups 
High Trust 32 3,97 
Low Trust 31 2,10 
High Power 32 3,19 
 Low Power 31 2,90 
 
Table 4. Participants‟ Responses Based on the Combi-
nation Between Trust and Power 
Status 
Number of 
Participants 
Voluntary 
Score Average 
Treatment 
Groups 
High Trust-
High Power 
17 4,12 
High Trust-
Low Power 
15 3,80 
Low Trust-
High Power 
15 2,13 
 Low Trust-Low 
Power 
16 2,06 
 
From Table 4. it is clear that both High-Trust-
High Power and High Trust-Low Power groups 
have high voluntary taxpayer compliance rate 
(their score is higher than the questionnaire‟s 
median, 3), while Low Trust-High Power and Low 
Trust-Low Power groups have low voluntary 
taxpayer compliance (their score is lower than the 
questionnaire‟s median, 3). The highest voluntary 
rate is shown by the High Trust-High Power group 
(voluntary score 4,12), while the lowest is shown by 
Low Trust-Low Power group (voluntary score 2,06). 
 
Hypothesis Test 
Before executing the ANOVA test, the rese-
archer has done the normality and homogeneity 
test. From Levene‟s test, the researcher found Sig. 
value of 0,711 (p>0,05). That founding shows that 
the data is homogenous. Normality test, however, 
found that the data is not normal. The cause was 
the tendency or skewness of this data. ANOVA test 
is still a robust event though there is an abnormal 
data distribution that was caused by the skewness 
of data distribution [4]. Thus the ANOVA hypo-
thesis test was still being continued. 
To test the main effect and interaction bet-
ween the two independent variables, Trust and 
Power, the researcher used a two-way ANOVA test 
with gender and age as the controlling variable. 
The result can be seen in the table 5. 
Based on the data in Table 5, it could be seen 
that the main effect for Trust variable shows a 
significant result with Sig. value of 0,000 (p < 0,01). 
Meanwhile, the main effect of Power shows the 
non-significant result with Sig. value of 0,334 (p > 
0,05). For Trust and Power interaction (Trust * 
Power), the ANOVA test result shows a non-
significant result with Sig. value of 0,538 (p > 0,05). 
 Next, the researcher did ANOVA post hoc test 
by using Tukey‟s HSD method. This test was done 
to understand the signification of differences in 
voluntary taxpaying rate between the groups. 
Below is the post hoc test result by using Tukey‟s 
HSD method for each group. 
From Table 6, it can be seen that there is a 
significant difference in voluntary taxpaying rate 
between the groups: (1) High Trust-High Power 
and Low Trust-High Power; (2) High Trust-High 
Power and Low Trust-Low Power; (3) High Trust-
Low Power and Low Trust-High Power; and (4) 
High Trust-Low Power and Low Trust-Low Power 
with Sig. value of 0,000 (p<0,05) each. From that 
result, is known that Hypothesis 2, 3, 4, and 5 are 
supported.  
 
Discussion 
 According to the slippery slope theory, tax-
payer trust on tax authority and the power of tax 
authority are two important factors that affect 
taxpayer into voluntary paying their tax [7]. The 
taxpayer will voluntary pay their tax if their trust 
on tax authority is high, supported by tax authority 
with power to overview the taxpayers [7]. On the 
other hand, taxpayer tends to avoid their 
responsibility to pay tax if the taxpayer has low 
trust and tax authority do not have the power to 
overview the taxpayers [7]. 
This research found that taxpayer trust on tax 
authority positively, and significantly, influence 
their voluntary compliance. This fits with slippery 
slope theory and the experiment that was done by 
[3] and [14]. Taxpayers believe that the tax that 
they paid to tax authority is being used as it should 
by the country, and that grows a synergic relation 
between taxpayer and tax authority [7] [14]. In 
other words, maximum services and government‟s 
honesty in handling the fund originated from the 
taxpayer will make the taxpayer trust them, so the 
taxpayer will voluntary pay their tax. 
However, for the trust variable, this research 
found that tax authority‟s power does not affect 
voluntary taxpayer compliance. Although the 
direction of the data went according to slippery 
slope theory (voluntary taxpayer compliance on 
High Power treatment (3,19) > Low Power (2,97)), 
there is no significant result from that difference. 
Aside from that, this research could not found a 
significant interaction between trust and fear 
variable. As a result, this researcher did multiple 
comparison tests with Tukey‟s HSD method to find 
experimental groups that have significant response 
difference(s), as shown in Table 6. 
Yasa: Taxpayer Compliance from the Perspective of Slippery Slope Theory 
 
57 
Based on the data from Table 6, there is no 
significant difference on compliance between the 
high trust on high power tax authority and high 
power (4,12) and taxpayer with low trust on tax 
authority and low power tax authority, thus, 
Hypothesis 1 is supported. A taxpayer with high 
trust in high power tax authority shows high 
voluntary compliance, consistent with the result of 
[14] experiment. Although there is a difference in 
power, it does not cause any significant difference 
in taxpayer compliance, and both conditions show a 
high rate of taxpayer compliance. The findings of 
this research supported the slippery slope theory, 
that if taxpayers highly trust tax authority, then 
their compliance rate will still be high without even 
being affected by tax authority's power [3] [7] [14]. 
In other words, trust is a really important factor in 
supporting taxpayer to voluntary pay their taxes. 
For hypothesis 2, this research found that 
taxpayers with high trust on high power tax 
authority have a higher voluntary compliance from 
the taxpayer with low trust on high power tax 
authority, and thus Hypothesis 2 is supported. In 
accordance with slippery slope theory, high trust 
on high power tax authority pushes taxpayer to 
voluntarily compelled in paying their taxes [3] [7], 
as shown by the 4,12 score that shows high 
voluntary compliance rate. On the other hand, low 
trust in strong tax authority shows low voluntary 
compliance rate of 2,13. The low trust tends to 
cause the taxpayer to do tax evasion. However, the 
high power of tax authority caused them to pay 
their tax, though forcefully [3] [5] [7]. In other 
words, forced compliance will lower the voluntary 
compliance score. It is found in this research that 
the condition of low trust on high power tax 
authority shows low voluntary compliance score 
(2,13), consistent with the slippery slope theory. 
For hypothesis 3, this research found that 
taxpayer with high trust in high tax authority 
shows a higher voluntary compliance rate than the 
taxpayer with low trust in weak tax authority, this 
Hypothesis 3 is supported. The lowness of tax-
payer‟s trust, worsened by the low power tax 
authority, caused the taxpayer to have low volun-
tary compliance rate, as proved by their voluntary 
compliance score: 2,06, the lowest score amongst 
the experimental group. In accordance to slippery 
slope theory, taxpayer compliance is at the lowest 
level if the taxpayer has low trust on tax authority 
who have no power that could push the taxpayer to 
pay their tax [7]. 
Table 5. ANOVA Test Result 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 56.022a 3 18.674 29.910 .000 
Intercept 576.212 1 576.212 922.927 .000 
Trust 54.394 1 54.394 87.124 .000 
Power .593 1 .593 .949 .334 
Trust * Power .239 1 .239 .383 .538 
Error 36.836 59 .624   
Total 678.000 63    
Corrected Total 92.857 62    
a. R Squared = .603 (Adjusted R Squared = .583) 
 
Table 6. Tukey‟s HSD Post Hoc Test Result  
(I) Group (J) Group Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
High Trust-High Power High Trust - Low Power .32 .280 .670 
Low Trust - High Power 1.98* .280 .000 
Low Trust - Low Power 2.06* .275 .000 
High Trust-Low Power High Trust - High Power -.32 .280 .670 
Low Trust - High Power 1.67* .289 .000 
Low Trust - Low Power 1.74* .284 .000 
Low Trust-High Power High Trust - High Power -1.98* .280 .000 
High Trust - Low Power -1.67* .289 .000 
Low Trust - Low Power .07 .284 .994 
Low Trust-Low Power High Trust - High Power -2.06* .275 .000 
High Trust - Low Power -1.74* .284 .000 
Low Trust - High Power -.07 .284 .994 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
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For hypotheses 4 and 5, this research found a 
result that supported these two hypotheses, that 
taxpayer with high trust in low power tax 
authority (compliance score 3,80) shows higher 
voluntary compliance rate than taxpayer with low 
trust on high power tax authority (compliance 
score 2,13), also when compared when taxpayer 
with low trust on low power tax authority 
(compliance score 2,06). This finding shows that 
trust is the most important factor in building 
taxpayer compliance. Although having a high 
power, taxpayer voluntary compliance will still be 
low if the taxpayer does not have the trust in tax 
authority. On the other hand, even if the tax 
authority is weak in overviewing the tax process, it 
does not become an obstacle for taxpayers 
compliance to pay their tax if the taxpayers have 
high trust on the government of tax authority. 
 For hypothesis 6, this research did not find 
any significant differences on voluntary compliance 
between taxpayer with low trust in high power tax 
authority and taxpayer with low trust in low power 
tax authority. This is in accordance with the 
conjecture that low trust and weak tax authority 
caused the taxpayer to have the tendency to 
maximize their own benefits by not paying the tax 
[7]. Although tax authority has the power, that 
does not help growing taxpayer voluntary com-
pliance. A taxpayer may be paying their tax, but it 
was done forcefully, so their voluntary compliance 
score is still low. Overall, this research supported 
that the slippery slope theory that taxpayer‟s trust 
is the most important thing in growing their 
awareness and willingness to pay their tax. 
 
CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, AND 
LIMITATION 
Conclusion 
 Based on the results, this research concludes 
that taxpayer‟s trust on tax authority is a really 
important factor in pushing their compliance to 
voluntary pay their tax. In accordance to the 
slippery slope theory, taxpayer compliance rate will 
still be high if the taxpayer has high trust on tax 
authority even if the tax authority have weakness 
in observing the tax process in their country. 
Although tax authority‟s power could increase 
compliance, it is a forced compliance. Thus, if a 
country wants to achieve an ideal taxpayer 
behavior, that is, where taxpayers are willing to 
voluntarily pay their tax, then tax authority should 
focus on the efforts to increase the taxpayer‟s trust. 
 
Implication 
 Overall, this research‟s results support the 
slippery slope‟s framework, thus this research gives 
a theoretical contribution to explaining taxpayer‟s 
compliance behavior based on slippery slope 
theory. As far as the author knows, an experi-
mental study on slippery slope theory had only 
been done by [3] [7]. A research result with this 
experimental method is intended to be able to 
strengthen the relevance of slippery slope theory in 
explaining taxpayer compliance behavior. Other 
than that, the researcher hoped the tax authority 
to consider the result of the research to increase 
taxpayer trust on tax authority, because trust is 
the most important factor in increasing taxpayer‟s 
voluntariness in paying their tax. 
 
Limitations 
There are several limitations to this research: 
1. This research used the experimental method in 
testing the slippery slope theory, so the case 
used in experimental treatment still have not 
reflected the real condition. Thus, there is a 
need to be careful in generalizing the result of 
this research. 
2. In slippery slope theory, there are two types of 
taxpayer compliance: voluntary and forced. This 
result is only focused on the voluntary taxpayer 
compliance, and so it does not reflect taxpayer‟s 
behavior as fully as the slippery slope. 
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